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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Joshua Thomas Bennett appeals from his judgment of conviction for delivery of
marijuana following a jury trial. On appeal he challenges the district court's sustaining
of an objection during his cross-examination of the state's confidential informant and
asserts that the court violated his confrontation rights.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In July 2012, Mr. Sermon, a paid criminal informant for the Bonneville County
Sheriff's Office, purchased marijuana from Bennett in a controlled buy. (5/14/2013 Tr.,
p.222, L.5 - p.223, L.13; p.236, L.23 - p.237, L.3; p.244, Ls.6-22.) The state charged
Bennett with delivery of marijuana. (R., p.19.) Ultimately, Bennett stood trial (see 5/1415/2013 Trs.) and a jury found him guilty (5/15/2013 Tr., p.206, L.24 - p.209, L.12).
The district court entered judgment against Bennett and sentenced him to a unified term
of five years with two and a half years fixed.
notice of appeal. (R., pp.136-38.)
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(R., pp.131-32.) Bennett filed a timely

ISSUES
Bennett states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err, and violate Mr. Bennett's Sixth
Amendment right to confront his accuser, when it sustained the State's
relevance objection during his attempt to cross-examine the confidential
informant regarding matters testified to on direct examination and that
concerned his bias, interest, or motive?
(Appellant's brief, p.2.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Bennett failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it
limited defense counsel's cross-examination of a state's witness consistent with the
Idaho Rules of Evidence?
2.
Bennett never raised his confrontation claim to the district court. Has he failed to
establish fundamental error entitling him to review of this unpreserved issue?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Bennett Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Limiting
His Cross-Examination Consistent With The Idaho Rules Of Evidence

A

Introduction
During cross-examination, Bennett's counsel asked the state's confidential

informant, Mr. Sermon, how many times he had sold cocaine in the past. (5/15/2013
Tr., p.13, L.17.) The state objected to the question on the basis that it was not relevant
to Mr. Sermon's credibility.

(Id., p.13, L.18 - p.14, L.2.) Bennett countered that the

question was within the scope of direct examination. (Id., p.14, Ls.3-7.) The district
court asked for more foundation, opining that depending on how long ago the activity
occurred it may no longer be relevant.

(Id., p.14, Ls.12-13.)

Defense counsel laid

additional foundation, ascertaining that Mr. Sermon had been "busted" for selling
cocaine in 2009, that he had not sold cocaine since, but that he had sold it before. (Id.,
p.14, Ls.14-25.)
Before Bennett could continue his cross-examination, the state again objected:
Your Honor, I'm going to object to any further inquiry. He hasn't
been convicted of that. I allowed some of it because I felt it was relevant
to the cooperation agreement and why he was working in the first place.
But going into the specific instances is completely inappropriate, and it's
not a conviction. So I'm going to object to any further inquiry into this.
(Id., p.15, Ls.2-9.) Thedistrictcourtsustainedtheobjection. (Id., p.15, Ls.15-16.)
On appeal, Bennett argues that the district court abused its discretion by not
allowing him to continue asking Mr. Sermon how many times he had delivered cocaine.
(Appellant's brief, pp.3-7.) Application of the correct legal standards, however, shows
no abuse of discretion by the district court.
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B.

Standard Of Review
''This Court freely reviews the question of relevancy as an issue of law." State v.

Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667, 227 P.3d 918, 921 (2010). A district court's decision to
admit or exclude evidence proffered during cross-examination under Rule 608(b) is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 90-91, 856 P.2d
872, 880-81 (1993).

C.

Instances Of Past Conduct May Only Be Inquired Into If Relevant To A Witness's
Character For Truthfulness Or Untruthfulness
There is no right to unfettered cross-examination. During trial, Bennett sought to

cross-examine Mr. Sermon regarding how many times he sold cocaine. (5/15/2013 Tr.,
p.13, L.17.)

Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 permits, under certain circumstances, the

admission of "evidence of the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and
the nature of the felony" to attack the credibility of the witness. I.RE. 609(a). However,
by its terms, Rule 609 only applies to felony convictions. Id. The prosecutor, objecting
to Bennett's line of cross-examination, noted that Mr. Sermon had never been convicted
of delivery. (5/15/2013 Tr., p.15, Ls.2-9; see also id., p.11, Ls.14-24; p.16, Ls.14-23.)
Because there was no felony conviction, Bennett's line of cross-examination was not
permitted under Rule 609.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b) controls the admissibility of evidence of specific
instances of a witness's conduct, which did not result in a criminal conviction, for the
purpose of impeaching a witness and provides:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking
or supporting the credibility, of the witness, other than conviction of crime
as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They
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may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness
concerning (1) the character of the witness for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or (2) the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of
another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined
has testified.
I.R.E. 608(b). Whether to admit impeachment evidence under Rule 608(b) lies within
the discretion of the district court. Araiza, 124 Idaho at 90-91, 856 P.2d at 880-81. In
this case, how many times Mr. Sermon engaged in the specific conduct of delivering
cocaine was irrelevant to establishing "the character of the witness for truthfulness or
untruthfulness." The district court therefore, in a proper exercise of its discretion, did not
allow Bennett to continue asking Mr. Sermon to discuss how many times he had
delivered cocaine in the past.
On appeal, Bennett ignores these rules and instead analyzes this issue under
Rule 611. Under that rule, the district court is tasked with exercising
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses
and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless
consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.
I.R.E. 611 (a). During cross-examination, Bennett was able to elicit testimony from Mr.
Sermon acknowledging that he had been charged with delivering cocaine in 2009, that
those charges were dismissed because he worked as a confidential informant with the
state, and that, while he had not delivered cocaine since that date, he had delivered it
before that date. (5/15/2013Tr., p.11, L.11-p.12, L.2; p.14, Ls.15-25; p.16, Ls.14-23.)
Additional inquiry into each individual instance of delivery, in addition to being
impermissible under Rules of Evidence 608(b) and 609, would have only served to
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harass Mr. Sermon and needlessly waste the time of the court. The line of inquiry was
therefore properly limited under Rule 611.
Bennett asserts that asking Mr. Sermon how many times he delivered cocaine in
the past was relevant to his motivation to testify. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) It was not.
Considering Mr. Sermon stopped delivering when he became a confidential informant
four years before trial in 2009 (5/15/2013 Tr., p.14, L.23-25), and that he was currently
working as a paid informant and not in any danger of criminal prosecution (5/14/2013
Tr., p.222, L.21 - p.224, L.6), it would be marginally relevant at best.

See Roeh v.

Roeh, 113 Idaho 557, 559, 746 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Ct. App. 1987) ("As evidence goes
back further in time-that is, becomes more remote-it is entitled to decreasing
weight."). And during cross-examination a trial court can prevent interrogation that is
only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). Finally, it
is certainly not relevant to Mr. Sermon's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and
that is the only permitted purpose for inquiring into specific instances of conduct of a
witness under Rule 608(b).
Bennett also asserts that asking Mr. Sermon specifically how many times he had
delivered cocaine in the past was necessary to explore Mr. Sermon's bias, interest, and
motive.

(Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.)

In fact, those issues were already covered by

Bennett's cross-examination where he showed that Mr. Sermon had been a drug dealer
(5/15/2013 Tr., p.11, Ls.11-13); that he had been charged with delivery of cocaine in
2009 (id., p.11, Ls.14-22; p.14, Ls.23-25); that the charges were dismissed when he first
went to work with the state (id., p.11, L.23 - p.12, L.2); and that, though he never had to
serve any time in prison because the charges were dismissed, he had in fact sold
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cocaine (id., p.15, L.18 - p.16, L.23). He also showed that Mr. Sermon was now paid
between $200 and $300 per controlled buy. (Id., p.13, Ls.4-16.) Bennett was able to
explore Mr. Sermon's bias, interest, and motive.
Bennett has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by limiting
this line of inquiry, which was inadmissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The
district court should be affirmed.

D.

Even If The Court Erred By Limiting Bennett's Cross-Examination Consistent
With Rule 608(b), Such Error Would Be Harmless
Even if the district court erred by not ignoring Rule 608(b) and permitting Bennett

unfettered cross-examination into Mr. Sermon's specific instances of delivering cocaine,
such error would be harmless. "[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair
trial, not a perfect one."

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681.

And "[e]rror may not be

predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of
the party is affected .... " I.RE. 103(a); see also I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity
or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."). On appeal,
Bennett claims that his substantial rights to confront Mr. Sermon were violated when the
district court limited his cross-examination. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.) For the reasons
set forth below, that argument fails. (See Argument II.) Furthermore, as shown above,
without asking about each specific instance of delivering cocaine Bennett was still able
to explore Mr. Sermon's bias, motivation, and overall credibility. Therefore, even if the
district court erred by limiting Bennett's line of cross-examination consistent with Rule
608(b), such error would be harmless.
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11.
Bennett Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error Entitling Him To Review Of His
Unpreserved Confrontation Issue On Appeal
A.

Introduction
In addition to arguing that the district court abused its discretion by limiting his

cross-examination, Bennett also asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the court
violated his confrontation rights by not allowing him to ask Mr. Sermon how many times
he delivered cocaine prior to 2009. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.) Bennett never raised this
issue to the district court, nor has he established fundamental error entitling him to
review of this unpreserved issue on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must

be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson,
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).

Absent a timely objection, the

appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the fundamental
error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). Finally,
when reviewing a claimed violation of the Confrontation Clause the appellate court
defers to the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but gives free review
to the trial court's legal determinations. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 141, 176 P.3d
911 913 (2007),
I

C.

Limiting Bennett's Cross-Examination To Relevant Matters Did Not Violate His
Confrontation Rights
Under the fundamental error doctrine,
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the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Bennett fails to so much as attempt to carry
his burden to establish fundamental error and instead merely asserts that his
confrontation rights were violated.

In fact, Bennett cannot carry his burden because

application of the correct legal principles to the facts of this case shows no violation of
Bennett's constitutional rights, much less fundamental error.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right of confrontation includes the
right to cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 314 (1974) (citation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he main and essential purpose
of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination," and
that "[c]ross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness
and the truth of his testimony are tested."

kl at 315-316 (citations omitted).

It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense
counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the
contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation
Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such crossexamination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that
is repetitive or only marginally relevant. And as we observed earlier this
Term, "the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever
way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish."
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Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474
U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (emphasis original)).
Bennett was afforded the opportunity to effectively cross-examine Mr. Sermon.
(See 5/15/2013 Tr., p.11, L.11 - p.16, L.24.) As shown above, he verified that Mr.
Sermon had been a drug dealer, that he had been charged with delivery of cocaine in
the past, and that the charges were dismissed when he first went to work with the state.
(Id., p.11, L.11 - p.12, L.2.) He showed that he was paid between $200 and $300 per
controlled buy. (Id., p.13, Ls.4-16.) He showed that his drug bust was as recent as
2009. (Id., p.14, Ls.23-25.) And he showed, over the state's objection, that while Mr.
Sermon never served any prison time for delivering cocaine because the charges had
been dismissed, he had in fact sold cocaine. (Id., p.15, L.18 - p.16, L.23.) Bennett's
confrontation rights were therefore amply vindicated.
The reasonable limits imposed by the district court on Bennett's crossexamination, which were consistent with Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b), did not infringe
upon Bennett's confrontation rights. To contend that those reasonable limits violated
his rights, Bennett must argue for a limitless right of cross-examination, which is plainly
contrary to the precedent of the United States Supreme Court. Bennett's rights were
not violated by the district court's proper and reasonable limitation on crossexamination.

He has failed to show any error by the district court, much less

fundamental error. The district court should be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Bennett's conviction.

DATED this 6th day of November, 2014.

~~
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of November, 2014, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

~ENGER
Deputy Attorney General
RJS/pm
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